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ARTICLE
Katerina P. Lewinbuk
Keep Suing All the Lawyers1: Recent Developments
in Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding & Abetting
a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Abstract. Lawyers have increasingly become subject to liability under
various legal theories, ranging from traditional legal malpractice or negligence
liability claims to various third-party actions. Most recently, state and federal
courts across the country have recognized attorney liability for aiding and
abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty. This Article will address the current
status of the cause of action for a lawyer’s aiding and abetting her client’s breach
of fiduciary duty, explain the commonalities and distinguish nuances as outlined
by particular states, examine recent decisions by federal courts that have
recognized the cause of action, and culminate in its conclusion by predicting
how the cause of action will continue to develop in the long run.
Author. Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston. This
Article, along with all of my academic work, is dedicated to the precious
memory of my father, Dr. Vladimir Z. Parton, who will always remain my
inspiration. Special thanks go to my husband Dan, my children Alexandra and
Michael, and to my mother for their endless love and support. In addition, I
would like to express gratitude to my very gifted and dedicated research
assistants, Teresa Lakho and Maggie Lu, for their assistance in preparation of
this Article.

1. The original quote states, “[T]he first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH, act 4, sc. 2. The author changed
the quote to fit the topic of this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has become the new norm for lawyers to face a high level of exposure
under various legal theories, ranging from traditional legal malpractice or
negligence liability claims to various third-party actions.2 Specifically, a
claim alleging the aiding and abetting of a client’s breach of fiduciary duty
has become rather common and accepted by many states in the last few
years.3 As will be discussed later, for example, when an attorney
misappropriates funds by substantially assisting in preparing deeds with the
knowledge that doing so will be to the detriment of others, a court will likely
find a valid claim of aiding and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.4
Prior to 2008,5 only twelve states recognized aiding and abetting a client’s
breach of fiduciary duty as a valid cause of action against attorneys,6 and no
reviewing court rejected its validity at that time.7 Since 2008, eleven

2. See United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings), Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1227 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Cent. Bank Denver, 892 P.2d 230, 236
(Colo. 1995)) (explaining “[a] negligent misrepresentation claim is based not on a contractual duty but
on an independent common law duty . . . to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating information on which other parties may justifiably rely”); In re Temporomandibular
Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1492 (8th Cir. 1997) (“One who undertakes . . .
to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking . . . .” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 324A (1965))); see also First Nat’l Bank v. Lane & Douglass, 961 F. Supp. 153, 154 (N.D. Tex.
1997) (involving a claim of legal malpractice), rev’d on other grounds, 142 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 1998).
But see First Nat’l Bank, 961 F. Supp. at 156 (“In fact, several courts have held that an attorney owes no
duty to a third party even when the attorney renders an opinion upon which he knows the third party
will rely.” (first citing FDIC v. Howse, 802 F. Supp. 1554, 1563–64 (S.D. Tex. 1992); then citing
Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1384, 1494–95 (N.D. Tex. 1988); and then citing Banc
One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (5th Cir. 1995))).
3. See Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding
and Abetting a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 146 (2008) (discussing the growing
trend in state courts to examine claims against lawyers for aiding and abetting a client’s breach of
fiduciary duty).
4. PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp.,
387 S.W.3d 525, 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
5. See Lewinbuk, supra note 3, at 146 (focusing on developments in aiding and abetting a client’s
breach of fiduciary duty until 2008).
6. See id. (listing several jurisdictions recognizing aiding and abetting claims, including California,
the District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Texas).
7. Id. (reporting not one state has specifically rejected the validity of an aiding and abetting
theory).
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additional states have recognized this cause of action,8 while a handful of
recent decisions have questioned the theory or rejected it altogether.9
Moreover, several federal courts now allow a complaint for aiding and
abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty against an attorney, even though,
in applicable states, state courts have not yet ruled upon the issue.10 To

8. The eleven states are Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See Rivet v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
316 F. App’x 440, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2009) (recognizing a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
under Michigan law); see also In re Senior Cottages of Am., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2007)
(noting Minnesota has recognized that aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a cause of
action); Wiatt v. Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., 838 F. Supp. 2d 296, 307 (D.N.J. 2012) (acknowledging
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a cause of action in New Jersey); Zazzali v. Hirschler
Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R. 495, 519 (D. Del. 2012) (articulating the elements of a breach of fiduciary duty
under Delaware law); Chalpin v. Snyder, 207 P.3d 666, 677 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (finding aiding and
abetting is a valid cause of action against lawyers in Arizona); Kahn v. Britt, 765 S.E.2d 446, 454
(Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (reiterating the elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Kahala Royal Corp.
v. Goodsill, Anderson, Quinn & Stifel, L.L.P., 151 P.3d 732, 751–52, 756 (Haw. 2007) (recognizing a
cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, but refusing to grant relief because
the elements for the cause of action were not satisfied); Goodman v. Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C.,
323 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (finding the duty a lawyer owes a client is higher than that of
a typical agent-principal relationship (quoting Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978))); Gordon v. Busbee, 723 S.E.2d 822, 830 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (reciting the elements of a cause
of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in South Carolina); PNC Multifamily Capital
Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P., 387 S.W.3d at 558 (finding a cause of action for aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty is a “valid complaint” in Tennessee); Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 768 N.W.2d 641,
660 (Wis. 2009) (acknowledging aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a valid claim in
Wisconsin).
9. See Bottom v. Bailey, 767 S.E.2d 883, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding “no such cause
of action [for aiding and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty] exists in North Carolina”); Veer
Right Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Czarnowski Display Serv., Inc., No. 14 CVS 1038, 2015 WL 504977, at *3
(N.C. Feb. 4, 2015) (“Whether North Carolina recognizes a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty remains an open question.” (citing Battleground Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. McGeough,
No. 05 CVS 18918, 2007 WL 3071618, at *7 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007))); see also DeVries Dairy,
L.L.C. v. White Eagle Coop. Ass’n, 974 N.E.2d 1194, 1195 (Ohio 2012) (concluding Ohio does not
recognize tort claims against persons acting in concert); Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Looper Reed
& McGraw, P.C., No. 05-15-00055-CV, 2016 WL 164528, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.)
(holding “the trial court correctly dismissed [an aiding and abetting] claim” where an attorney did not
engage in an independent tortious act or misrepresentation outside of the scope of the representation
of his client).
10. See Invest Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2001)
(noting “[i]t is undisputed that . . . the New Hampshire Supreme Court has yet to expressly consider
whether to adopt the tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty[,]” but concluding the Court
“would recognize the tort, and would adopt a version incorporating . . . the Restatement (Second) of
Torts”); see also Abrams v. McGuireWoods, L.L.P., 518 B.R. 491, 499–500 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (stating
Indiana has not yet recognized a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, but concluding
it would not be a departure from their current causes of action for aiding and abetting); Design Pallets,
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support their position, some federal courts reasoned that state courts in
applicable jurisdictions would likely consider aiding and abetting in a client’s
breach of fiduciary duty as a valid cause of action if called upon to decide.11
Part II of this Article will address the current status of a lawyer’s aiding
and abetting her client’s breach of fiduciary duty as a cause of action (“aiding
and abetting” cases), beginning with the prima facie case and its required
elements. The Article will also explain commonalities and distinguish
nuances as outlined by particular states, analyze how these distinctions may
affect an accused attorney, and evaluate final outcomes in specific cases. It
will then discuss the current state of aiding and abetting cases nationwide,
focusing on recent opinions and how attorney liability has been addressed
and resolved by different courts. Subsequently, the Article will examine
recent decisions by federal courts recognizing the cause of action, while
noting some instances where the courts held the cause of action valid despite
lacking such determinations by the applicable state courts. That part of the
Article will also discuss the factors that may have influenced the courts in
their final determinations in aiding and abetting cases. The Article will
culminate in its conclusion section by predicting how the cause of action
will continue to develop in the long run and anticipate ways in which it will
have an impact on the legal profession as a whole. It will also offer strategies
for minimizing a lawyer’s exposure in light of the current status quo of
aiding and abetting causes of action nationwide.

Inc. v. GrayRobinson, P.A., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (refusing to dismiss an aiding
and abetting claim because the plaintiff had “sufficiently alleged a fiduciary duty”); Reis v. Barley,
Snyder, Senft & Cohen, L.L.C., 484 F. Supp. 2d 337, 351–52 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (recognizing state courts’
refusal to expand Pennsylvania law for aiding and abetting due to lack of precedent from the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, but still finding a valid claim against the attorney), rev’d on other grounds, 426 F.
App’x 79 (3d Cir. 2011).
11. See Reis, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 350 (citing Pierce v. Rossetta Corp., No. 88-5873, 1992 WL
165817, at *20–23 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1992)) (listing the three elements for a valid aiding and abetting
breach of a fiduciary duty claim under Pennsylvania as outlined in Pierce to provide guidance to state
courts); see also Abrams, 518 B.R. at 499–500 (discussing current causes of action for breach of fiduciary
duty, aiding and abetting liability for torts, their relation to each other, and why a court would likely
adopt aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty as a valid cause of action). But see Invest Almaz,
243 F.3d at 82–84 (providing state courts with direction by explaining the “knowledge” element in the
adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876B despite the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
not recognizing such claims).
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II. CURRENT STATE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION NATIONWIDE (2016)
Prior to 2008, twelve jurisdictions recognized a cause of action against a
lawyer in aiding and abetting cases: California, Colorado, District of
Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Texas.12 Since then, eleven states have
acknowledged the cause of action’s validity: Arizona,13 Delaware,14
Georgia,15 Hawaii,16 Kentucky,17 Michigan,18 Minnesota,19 New Jersey,20
South Carolina,21 Tennessee,22 and Wisconsin.23 Accordingly, at least
twenty-three states have adopted the theory to date.
In those states, the courts disposed of aiding and abetting cases in one of
the four following ways. First, only two courts found an attorney liable
under the alleged aiding and abetting theory.24 Second, some courts
acknowledged the accused attorney “may” or “could” be found liable under
the aiding and abetting theory without actually arriving at a specific

12. See Lewinbuk, supra note 3, at 150 (enumerating jurisdictions recognizing aiding and abetting
claims).
13. See, e.g., Chalpin, 207 P.3d at 677 (finding aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty a
valid cause of action against lawyers in Arizona).
14. See, e.g., Zazzali v. Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R. 495, 519 (D. Del. 2012) (articulating
the elements of a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware
law).
15. See, e.g., Kahn v. Britt, 765 S.E.2d 446, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (reciting the elements to
prove a breach of fiduciary duty).
16. See, e.g., Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill, Anderson, Quinn & Stifel, L.L.P., 151 P.3d 732,
756 (Haw. 2007) (addressing and aiding and abetting claim, but refusing to find an attorney liable
because the elements of such claim were not satisfied).
17. See, e.g., Goodman v. Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C., 323 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009)
(addressing an aiding and abetting claim against the attorney, but finding the claim must fail because
there was no fiduciary duty).
18. See, e.g., Rivet v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 F. App’x 440, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2009)
(acknowledging the cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty exists in Michigan).
19. See, e.g., In re Senior Cottages of Am., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 997, 1001–02 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting
Minnesota has recognized that aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a valid cause of action).
20. See, e.g., Wiatt v. Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., 838 F. Supp. 2d 296, 307 (D.N.J. 2012) (finding
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a valid cause of action in New Jersey).
21. See, e.g., Gordon v. Busbee, 723 S.E.2d 822, 830 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (articulating the
elements needed to prove breach of a fiduciary duty in South Carolina).
22. See, e.g., PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev.
Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 556–58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (stating a valid complaint exists when pleading
a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty).
23. See, e.g., Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 768 N.W.2d 641, 660 (Wis. 2009) (recognizing aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a valid claim in Wisconsin).
24. See infra Part II.B.1.
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determination on the merits.25 Third, other courts acknowledged the
validity of an aiding and abetting theory, pointing to facts supporting the
possibility of attorney liability while reversing summary judgment in the
attorney’s favor, and remanding for further proceedings.26 Finally, a
number of complaints were dismissed because the allegations did not
support a finding of aiding and abetting liability on behalf of the accused
attorney.27
A.

Elements Generally

Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides guidance for
courts to develop a standard for establishing liability for aiding and abetting
cases:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he . . . (a) does a tortious act in concert with the
other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.28

State courts frequently apply this standard to resolve allegations in aiding
and abetting cases.29 In such decisions, most discussions centered on the
“knowledge and substantial assistance” aspect of the test.30 While most
states agree that in order to establish the prima facie case for aiding and
abetting, the accused attorney must act outside the scope of
representation,31 state courts vary on whether constructive or actual

25. See infra Part II.B.2.
26. See infra Part II.B.3.
27. See infra Part II.B.4.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
29. See, e.g., Chalpin v. Snyder, 207 P.3d 666, 677 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing the validity
of an aiding and abetting claim in Arizona, and noting the elements of such claim are embodied in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (quoting Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters and Cement
Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 23 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc))).
30. See, e.g., Abrams v. McGuireWoods, L.L.P., 518 B.R. 491, 500 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (highlighting
the importance of the Restatement’s knowledge and substantial assistance elements).
31. See Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1062–63 (Or. 2006) (en banc) (holding an attorney
is subject to joint liability for a client’s breach of fiduciary duty only when the plaintiff shows the
attorney was acting outside the scope of the attorney-client relationship); see also Kahala Royal Corp. v.
Goodsill, Anderson, Quinn & Stifel, L.L.P., 151 P.3d 732, 752 (Haw. 2007) (concluding the plaintiff
failed to allege that the attorneys “possessed a desire to harm . . . independent of the desire to protect
their clients”); Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 182 (N.M. 1995) (holding an attorney’s duty to a
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knowledge is required.32 Moreover, of the courts that have outlined
whether actual or constructive knowledge is required, some have dismissed
cases due to a plaintiff’s inability to present sufficient facts to meet the
applicable standard.33
B. New State Courts Recognizing the Cause of Action Since 2008
As mentioned earlier, it is highly unlikely a court will find an attorney
liable for aiding and abetting a client’s wrongdoing, and, even less likely, for
a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.34 Two case examples—the Tensfeldt v.
Haberman35 case decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and the PNC
Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Community
Development Corp.36 case decided by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee—
are worthy of close examination.
1.

Courts That Found Attorneys Liable for Aiding & Abetting

In Tensfeldt, the court held an attorney liable for aiding and abetting his
client’s unlawful act when the attorney created a will that violated the client’s
divorce judgment.37 Although the attorney was aware of the stipulation in
statutory third-party beneficiary of an action is subject to an adversarial exception). In New Mexico,
the Supreme Court explained that the adversarial exception negates the attorney’s duty when “the third
party knows or should know that he or she cannot rely on the attorney to act for his or her benefit.”
Id. Likewise, in Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2005, pet. denied), the court found no cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty
absent allegations of a tortious act or misrepresentation committed outside the attorney’s
representation. Id. at 407.
32. See Zazzali v. Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R. 495, 519 (D. Del. 2012) (finding “routine”
practice for a corporation is not enough to show “how and why” an attorney’s position as corporate
attorney was used to aid and abet his client, and, that instead, “knowing participation” must be proven);
see also Chambers v. Weinstein, No. 157781/2013, 2014 WL 4276910, at *3–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22,
2014), aff’d in part, 135 A.D.3d 450 (App. Div. 2016) (mem.) (requiring actual knowledge, and finding
that e-mails are sufficient to prove or dispute knowledge); Bullmore v. Ernst & Young Cayman Island,
846 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148 (App. Div. 2007) (stating actual knowledge is required); Kaufman v. Cohen,
760 N.Y.S.2d 157, 169 (App. Div. 2003) (finding actual knowledge is required, and that constructive
knowledge is legally insufficient to impose liability under an aiding and abetting theory); Chem-Age
Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 776–78 (S.D. 2002) (holding constructive knowledge may
suffice).
33. See, e.g., Chambers, 2014 WL 4276910, at *13 (dismissing an aiding and abetting claim when
the plaintiff failed to meet the proper knowledge standard).
34. See supra Part II.A.
35. Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 768 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 2009).
36. PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp.,
387 S.W.3d 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
37. Tensfeldt, 768 N.W.2d at 644.

166

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 8:158

the divorce judgment that required his client to leave two-thirds of his net
estate to his three children, the attorney intentionally drafted an estate plan
where a majority of the estate fell into an inter vivos trust.38 When the client
died and the children did not receive two-thirds of the client’s estate per the
divorce judgment, the children filed suit and alleged an aiding and abetting
theory—among other torts—against the attorney.39 The attorney raised a
defense of immunity and privilege and argued he was protected from
third-party suits because he merely acted in his role as the client’s attorney.40
The court agreed that this defense is typically valid; however, the court held
that the attorney was not entitled to qualified immunity because he was
informed of the stipulations and was given a copy of the divorce judgment
by both the client and the client’s previous attorney. Nevertheless, the
attorney drafted documents attempting to give his client “something he was
not legally entitled to—an estate plan that violated a court judgment.”41
The Tensfeldt court explained that, although an attorney is typically
immune from third-party liability “based on the attorney’s failure to perform
a duty owed to a client[,] . . . [his] failure to perform an obligation to a client
is entirely distinct from conduct that assists the client committing an
unlawful act to the detriment of a third party.”42 More specifically, such
“immunity does not apply when the attorney acts in a malicious, fraudulent
or tortious manner which frustrates the administration of justice or to obtain
something for the client to which the client is not justly entitled.”43
Therefore, the attorney was found liable for aiding and abetting his client’s
unlawful act when he knowingly drafted an estate plan that was in violation
of a court order; and, as such, was not entitled to the privilege of
immunity.44
Similarly, in PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P., the
court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of an aiding and abetting claim,
and found liability for breach of a fiduciary duty owed to several

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 645–46, 656–58.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 658.
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partnerships.45 The court found a valid claim when the attorney prepared
joint-use agreements and quitclaim deeds without prior written consent and
with knowledge that doing so would violate previous agreements with other
partnerships.46 In that case, several entities entered into three partnership
agreements to create and manage apartment complexes between 2004 and
2005.47 Though represented by a firm, one attorney had the responsibility
of preparing documents and opinion letters regarding the legitimacy and
execution of the agreements.48 Thus, when the partnerships discovered the
general partner was misappropriating funds, they filed suit and subpoenaed
documents from the attorney.49 It was at that time they filed an amended
complaint to include a lawsuit against the attorney and firm for aiding and
abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.50
Although the court found the complaint “too vague to satisfy the
requirements” and not adequate to demonstrate the “substantial” assistance
requirement for a valid aiding and abetting cause of action, it recognized a
need to view the allegation in full context.51 In doing so, two specific
instances demonstrating the attorney’s substantial assistance and knowledge
were found.52 Therefore, the court allowed the tort of aiding and abetting
a breach of fiduciary duty, and reversed the lower court’s decision.53
2. Courts That Found an Attorney Could be Liable for Aiding &
Abetting
In an attempt to clarify the existing uncertainty and lack of specific
guidance on the issue, a few courts examined the allegations and found that
the facts may or could support a determination that the attorney is subject to
liability under the aiding and abetting theory.54 In many of those cases,

45. See PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp.,
387 S.W.3d 525, 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of a claim for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty).
46. Id. at 552–53.
47. Id. at 533.
48. Id. at 533–34.
49. Id. at 534–35.
50. Id. at 535.
51. Id. at 552.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 552, 558.
54. See Panoutsopoulos v. Chambliss, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647, 654 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding an
attorney may be liable for aiding and abetting a client to commit fraud); see also Alexander v. Anstine,
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however, the courts did not reach a determination on the merits for varying
reasons.55
The prima facie standard for an aiding and abetting claim varies slightly
from state to state, even among those jurisdictions that clearly accept the
theory as a whole. For example, one California court noted that “a
defendant can be liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in
the absence of an independent duty owed to the plaintiff[,]”56 while a
Colorado court held in Alexander v. Anstine,57 that “attorneys do not owe a
fiduciary duty to non-clients, but . . . anyone who knowingly participates in
the principal’s breach may be held liable for aiding and abetting the
breach.”58
Similarly, a Georgia court granted a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, reiterating that an aiding and abetting tort requires a plaintiff to
establish the following elements:
(1) through improper action or wrongful conduct and without privilege, the defendant
acted to procure a breach of the primary wrongdoer’s fiduciary duty to the

152 P.3d 497, 500 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (discussing whether an attorney may be held liable for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty to a non-client).
55. See Panoutsopoulos, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654 (recognizing aiding and abetting as a potential
claim, but not deciding the issue because the plaintiff could not prove the attorneys acted beyond their
representative role); see also Alexander, 152 P.3d at 503 (addressing aiding and abetting, but not deciding
the issue on the basis of standing).
56. Am. Master Lease, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 567. An interesting comparison can be drawn to a
distinct California case—Panoutsopoulos v. Chambliss—where a California Court of Appeals addressed a
different legal theory alleged against a lawyer. See 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654 (citations omitted) (“An
attorney may be held liable for conspiring with his or her client to commit actual fraud or for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. But plaintiffs can state a viable claim only if the attorneys’
actions went beyond their role as attorneys . . . .”). In that case, the plaintiff failed to state a viable
claim. Id. at 654–55. Distinctively, however, California cases have long supported the notion that an
attorney can be liable for participation in a breach. See Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 243
(Ct. App. 1991) (finding an attorney liable for participating in the trustees’ breach of fiduciary duty),
superseded by statute, 1991 CAL. STAT. 4108, as recognized in Pavicich v. Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125,
136 (Ct. App. 2000); see also King v. Johnston, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 269, 280–81 (Ct. App. 2009) (imposing
liability on a third-party for her participation in a breach of trust); Wolf v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp,
90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792, 793 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding an attorney liable for his involvement in a breach of
trust); City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 356
(Ct. App. 1998) (finding a financial advisor liable for its participation in a breach of trust).
57. Alexander v. Anstine, 152 P.3d 497 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
58. Id. at 500. The Colorado court, however, did not address the merits of the case because the
plaintiff lacked standing. Id. at 503. As a result, deciding whether the attorney was liable for a valid
claim of aiding and abetting was left “for another day.” Id.
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plaintiff; (2) with knowledge that the primary wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a
fiduciary duty, the defendant acted purposely and with malice and the intent
to injure; (3) the defendant’s wrongful conduct procured a breach of the
primary wrongdoer’s fiduciary duty; and (4) the defendant’s tortious conduct
proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.59

In that case, the plaintiff was involved in a land dispute and was ordered
to pay an awarded amount.60 Prior to the judgment, the plaintiff transferred
his personal assets into a trust and hired several attorneys to protect it.61
When the plaintiff failed to pay the judgment, his creditors filed suit claiming
he and his co-trustees fraudulently transferred assets to prevent collection
of the judgment.62 With the attorneys’ advice, the trustee settled the dispute
and sold a part of the assets, specifically a cattle ranch, without the plaintiff’s
approval.63 As a result, the plaintiff filed suit against the attorneys for aiding
and abetting, but summary judgment was awarded to the defense attorneys
because all elements for aiding and abetting were not met.64 The court
emphasized that aiding and abetting cases required an attorney to act
improperly and without privilege, which meant acting outside the scope of
representation.65 Thus, summary judgment was proper because the
attorneys took an active role in all aspects of the litigation and were not
strangers to the trust.66 Much like the above-discussed decisions, the
Georgia court was deprived of the opportunity to further address the details
of the claim when it granted the summary judgment motion.67

59. Kahn v. Britt, 765 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting White v.
Shamrock Bldg. Sys., Inc., 669 S.E.2d 168, 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)). In Kahn, the defense was granted
summary judgment on the aiding and abetting claim. Id. at 459.
60. Id. at 452.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 458–59.
65. See id. at 458 (concluding the elements for an aiding and abetting claim were not met).
66. Id. at 459.
67. See id. (upholding a grant of summary judgment).
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3. Courts That Reversed and Remanded Summary Judgment Because
Existing Facts Do or May Support the Finding of Liability for Aiding &
Abetting
Many courts have recently,68 and previously,69 addressed aiding and
abetting allegations and determined such allegations were possibly
supported by proper grounds. As such, these courts reversed summary
judgments issued by lower courts, and remanded for further
determination.70 Similar to others, these courts expressed their approval of
the theory and attached liability, but did not engage in the factual
determination and final case disposition.71 For example, in one case, the
court ruled that the allegations made were sufficient to satisfy the elements
of an aiding and abetting cause of action.72 Similarly, in a different case, the
68. See Stueve Bros. Farms, L.L.C. v. Berger Kahn, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 116, 133 (Ct. App. 2013)
(reversing a lower court’s decision to allow a cause of action for aiding and abetting, and explaining “a
third[-]party who knowingly assists a trustee in breaching his or her fiduciary duty may, dependent
upon the circumstances, be held liable along with that trustee for participating in the breach of trust”).
In American Master, two theories of liability for aiding and abetting were recognized by the court. Am.
Master Lease, L.L.C. v. Idanta Partners, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 548, 569 (Ct. App. 2014) (“Thus, there are
two different theories pursuant to which a person may be liable for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty.”). Under the first theory, the court required “that the aider and abettor owe a fiduciary
duty to the victim and . . . that the aider and abettor provide substantial assistance to the person
breaching his or her fiduciary duty.” Id. Under the second theory, liability arises “when the aider and
abettor commits an independent tort”––i.e., makes a “conscious decision to participate in tortious
activity for the purpose of assisting another in performing a wrongful act.” Id. at 568–69. The second
theory was argued and proved by the plaintiffs in American Master, which established a valid claim. Id.
69. See, e.g., Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
(reversing the lower court’s decision to dismiss a claim). Although Illinois courts have never found
attorneys liable for aiding and abetting a client in the commission of an unlawful act, courts “have not
prohibited such actions.” Id. at 768. Illinois courts have established that, an attorney “may not use his
license to practice law as a shield to protect himself from the consequences of his participation in an
unlawful or illegal conspiracy.” Id. (quoting Celano v. Frederick, 203 N.E.2d 774, 778 (Ill. App. Ct.
1964)). Moreover, “[t]he same policy should prevent an attorney from escaping liability for knowingly
and substantially assisting a client in the commission of a tort.” Id. The case was reversed and
remanded to allow an aiding and abetting claim against the attorney. Id.
70. See Echelon Homes, L.L.C. v. Carter Lumber Co., No. 267233, 2006 WL 1867716, at *11
(Mich. Ct. App. July 6, 2006) (reversing and remanding for a jury trial to determine if aiding and
abetting a breach of a fiduciary duty claim was viable); Thornwood, 799 N.E.2d at 769 (reversing and
remanding for further inquiry).
71. See, e.g., Am. Master Lease, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 567 (noting attorneys may be liable for aiding
and abetting a breach of a fiduciary duty only if the necessary elements are met, and remanding for
further determination).
72. See In re Senior Cottages of Am., 482 F.3d 997, 1007 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding a tort was
committed against the plaintiff, that the defendant’s attorney knew the primary tortfeasor’s conduct
was in breach of a duty, and that the attorney substantially assisted in that breach).
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court found grounds for a valid aiding and abetting claim based on the
attorney’s knowledge and participation in the breach that resulted in the
plaintiff’s damages.73 In another case, the court explained that although it
appeared all aiding and abetting elements were met, an additional showing
of specific instances of “substantial” assistance were required—a statement
alone was too vague to satisfy the element.74
As an example, the Court of Appeals of Arizona in Chalpin v. Snyder75
reversed the lower court’s decision that aiding and abetting liability was not
valid and remanded for further consideration.76 In that case, an insurer
added the insured’s president’s daughter to a commercial vehicle liability
policy.77 When the daughter was in a car accident, the insurer affirmed that
the accident would be covered and that the insurer would defend the
litigation.78 A law firm was hired by the insurer to attempt to disavow
coverage when settlement attempts failed.79 Although the attorney and law
firm opined that the insurer could not deny coverage, they nevertheless
suggested filing a declaratory claim.80 Even though judgment was rendered
in favor of the insured, the insured filed a suit against the law firm and the
attorney for aiding and abetting, as well as for malicious prosecution.81
In Chalpin, the court reiterated that aiding and abetting claims have been
previously determined valid in civil lawsuits by Arizona courts.82 Moreover,
it explained Arizona’s higher court previously clarified “lawyers have no
special privilege against civil suit.”83 Accordingly, it rejected the lower
court’s finding that aiding and abetting liability is not a valid cause of action
against lawyers and remanded for further proceedings.84
73. See Tamposi v. Denby, 974 F. Supp. 2d 51, 61–62 (D. Mass. 2013) (affirming the plaintiff
had a valid aiding and abetting claim).
74. See PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp.,
387 S.W.3d 525, 552–53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (highlighting two specific instances where the attorney
provided substantial assistance, and concluding a reasonable inference could be made that the attorney
acted with knowledge in aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, allowing the tort to survive a
motion to dismiss).
75. Chalpin v. Snyder, 207 P.3d 666 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
76. Id. at 678.
77. Id. at 668–69.
78. Id. at 669.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 669–70.
81. Id. at 670.
82. Id. at 677.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 678.
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Similar to many previous decisions, numerous courts confirmed the
theoretical validity of aiding and abetting claims, while offering very little in
terms of the specific factual guidelines to be applied to predict the outcome
in specific scenarios.85 Based on varying precedent from across the nation,
it is now obvious the aiding and abetting theory is an overall acceptable
avenue for relief that can potentially be established.86 However, it remains
unclear what type of facts will likely lead to a guaranteed recovery and
monetary gain under the theory.87
4. Courts That Have Dismissed the Cause of Action Because the
Facts and Allegations Did Not Support a Finding of Aiding & Abetting
Liability
A number of cases nationwide examined the aiding and abetting
allegations in the past, and determined that the plaintiffs had failed to
establish liability due to insufficient facts for various reasons.88 Similarly,
various courts examined the facts presented and determined that the
plaintiffs failed to establish one or more elements needed for the prima facie

85. See Lewinbuk, supra note 3, at 150 (“Although a number of jurisdictions agree on the
essential elements that need to be established in order to state a claim for attorney’s aiding and abetting
her client’s breach of fiduciary duty, these courts’ requirements are certainly not identical.”).
86. See id. (“Most states require the plaintiff to demonstrate knowledge or knowing
participation, substantial assistance in the breach, and damages. The threshold requirement in virtually
all jurisdictions is for the plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant attorney’s client owed a fiduciary duty
to the plaintiff.”).
87. See id. (arguing courts are not consistent when establishing the requirements of a claim for
attorneys aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty).
88. See Alexander v. Anstine, 152 P.3d 497, 503 (Colo. 2007) (concluding a lawsuit against an
attorney for aiding and abetting cannot be sustained when the plaintiff is unable to prove the attorney’s
client breached a fiduciary duty in the first place); Goodman v. Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C.,
323 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
must fail as a matter of law because there was no duty.”); Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom,
601 N.W.2d 179, 188–89 (Minn. 1999) (reasoning the plaintiff failed to establish substantial assistance
in the breach because he lacked “actual knowledge” that the primary tort-feasor’s conduct was
wrongful); Durham v. Guest, 171 P.3d 756, 762–63 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (noting “[t]he social benefit
of proper legal advice and assistance often makes it appropriate not to hold lawyers liable for activities
in the course of a representation[;]” however, the plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action because
the alleged aiding and abetting attorney acted only to protect the client’s interests and was not outside
the scope of her duties); Bullmore v. Ernst & Young Cayman Island, 846 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148–49
(App. Div. 2007) (dismissing a claim for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty because the
plaintiff failed to prove actual knowledge or substantial assistance); Kaufman v. Cohen, 760 N.Y.S.2d
157, 169–70 (App. Div. 2003) (determining the plaintiff was unable to establish all elements of an
aiding and abetting claim because the knowledge requirement was based on conclusory statements).
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case of aiding and abetting.89 One court, for example, reiterated that in
order to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law, a
Plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) a
breach of the fiduciary’s duty, and (3) a knowing participation in that breach
by [the alleged aider and abettor].”90 Similarly, a different court emphasized
“public policy demands that attorneys, in the exercise of their proper
functions as such, shall not be civilly liable for their acts when performed in
good faith and for the honest purpose of protecting the interests of their
clients.”91 In that case, determining the attorney did not act outside the
scope of his duty, the court explained, “[W]here one acts only in the
execution of the duties of his calling or profession, and does not go beyond
it, and does not actually participate in the trespass, he is not liable, though
what he does may aid another in its commission.”92
In one particular instance, the court determined a plaintiff failed to
establish the “knowing participation” requirement of the claim because
“routine” practices for a corporation are not enough to show “how and
why” an attorney’s position as a corporate lawyer was used for aiding and
abetting purposes.93 Similarly, a different court held a plaintiff failed to
establish the “actual knowledge” element of an aiding and abetting claim,
explaining that “[t]o find a defendant secondarily liable as aiding and
abetting an unlawful breach of fiduciary duty, the defendant aider and
abettor himself must know that the primary wrongdoer’s conduct constitutes
a breach of duty and give substantial assistance or encouragement to that
wrongdoer to so act.”94 To further clarify the requirements of the
substantial assistance element, a different court explained that conditional
advice must have a direct link to a defendant’s actions thereafter “however
suspect and legally vulnerable it might be.”95 In that case, the plaintiff failed
to establish the injury and damages element pertaining to the claim.96

89. See, e.g., Bullmore, 846 N.Y.S.2d at 148 (describing the elements of a cause of action for aiding
and abetting, and finding the plaintiff failed to allege actual knowledge or substantial participation
against the defendants).
90. Zazzali v. Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R. 495, 519 (D. Del. 2012) (citation omitted).
91. Art Capital Grp., L.L.C. v. Neuhaus, 896 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (App. Div. 2010).
92. Id. (quoting Ford v. Williams, 13 N.Y. 577, 584 (1856)).
93. Zazzali, 482 B.R. at 519.
94. Wiatt v. Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., 838 F. Supp. 2d 296, 307–08 n.1 (D. N.J. 2012).
95. In re Senior Cottages of Am., L.L.C., 438 B.R. 414, 427 (D. Minn. 2010).
96. Id. at 428.
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Despite a majority consensus on the validity of the aiding and abetting
theory, it is rather difficult to prevail on such a claim. Since only a handful
of plaintiffs actually recover damages against an attorney under the aiding
and abetting theory, it is difficult to predict which specific facts would be
needed to guarantee, or at least improve, the chances of recovery.97
5.

Federal Courts That Have Recognized the Cause of Action

Since 2008, several federal courts have recognized claims for aiding and
abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty, even though state courts in the
applicable jurisdiction have not.98 In recognizing a cause of action for
aiding and abetting a fiduciary breach, some federal courts provided a
specific analysis, discussing why the pertinent state would have likely
recognized the cause of action, and how the state court would have decided
the issue—if given the opportunity.99 Federal courts often had to respond
to a defendant lawyer’s motion to dismiss the cause of action, and their
rulings in those cases varied.100 Among those, some decisions took an
97. See, e.g., PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI, L.P. v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev.
Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding to the chancery court to try the case on
its merits).
98. See Abrams v. McGuireWoods, L.L.P., 518 B.R. 491, 499–500 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (rejecting a
plausible aiding and abetting claim, and explaining that “even if it hasn’t yet recognized the cause of
action, the Indiana Supreme Court would do so,” because aiding and abetting liability is not a separate
tort, “but rather a theory for holding a person liable who knowingly assists . . . a wrongdoer”). The
court further reasoned that recognizing an aiding and abetting claim would “not represent a departure
for Indiana courts . . . for the particular tort of breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. But see Crystal Valley
Sales, Inc. v. Anderson, 22 N.E.3d 646, 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Indiana does not recognize such a
cause of action [for aiding and abetting]. We believe that the decision to adopt a new cause of action
for aiding and abetting in the breach of fiduciary duty is a decision better left to the legislature or our
supreme court.”).
99. For example, in Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Senft & Cohen, L.L.C., 484 F. Supp. 2d 337 (E.D. Pa.
2007), rev’d on other grounds, 426 F. App’x 79 (3d Cir. 2011), the court predicted that, if given the
opportunity, the “Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would recognize a cause of action for aiding and
abetting breach of a fiduciary duty.” Id. at 350. In particular, the court set forth three elements for
aiding and abetting breach of a fiduciary duty under Pennsylvania law: “(1) a breach of a fiduciary duty
owed to another; (2) knowledge of the breach by the aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance
or encouragement by the aider and abettor in effecting that breach.” Id. In a separate case and
jurisdiction, the court stated that the “New Hampshire Supreme Court has yet to expressly consider
whether to adopt the tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty . . . [but] would recognize
the tort, and would adopt a version incorporating the principles of aiding and abetting liability set forth
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” Invest Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57,
82–83 (1st Cir. 2001).
100. See, e.g., Design Pallets, Inc. v. GrayRobinson, P.A., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1258 (M.D. Fla.
2007) (refusing to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff alleged valid claims and
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approach similar to the one adopted by state courts, determining the
plaintiff had insufficient facts to establish liability under the aiding and
abetting theory.101 As an example, one such claim failed because the court
determined no fiduciary duty existed, and accordingly, the plaintiff could
not establish the element of substantial assistance.102
In that case, the plaintiff, acting on behalf of several hedge funds, brought
suit for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims,
against its former directors and fund administrators for damages caused
directly to the hedge funds.103 In particular, the plaintiff claimed the
defendants did not adequately inform investors in the hedge funds about
specific securities each fund held, and thus acted fraudulently for their own
personal gain.104 The plaintiff failed, though, to allege facts that showed
the “special circumstances” necessary to allege a fiduciary duty on the part
of the primary wrongdoer, as is required by state law.105 The court further
clarified that the complaint only stated conclusory allegations as “conscious
intent” and, in doing so, relied on an opinion that provided no support to
its claim.106 Accordingly, the court dismissed the claim because the first
element for a valid aiding and abetting cause of action could not be met.107

damages existed). In Abrams, however, the court actually dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff
could not plausibly establish the element of substantial assistance—i.e., that an underlying breach of
fiduciary duty actually occurred. Abrams, 518 B.R. at 504. The court further reasoned Indiana law does
not recognize the claim but likely would if given the opportunity. Id.
101. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. 04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 566900, at *12
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2006) (granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
102. See, e.g., Court Appointed Receiver of Lancer Offshore, Inc. v. Citco Grp. Ltd.,
No. 05-60080-CIV, 2011 WL 1233126, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2011) (“As analyzed in the section on
gross negligence, the Court finds that the Receiver’s attempt to allege that CGL and CFS-USA owed
the Funds a duty to disclose is untenable.”).
103. Id. at *1 n.1, *4.
104. Id. at *3 n.4, *3.
105. See id. at *4 (“Here, . . . Receiver argues the Director Defendants’ fiduciary duty should be
imputed to CGL and CFS-USA . . . . [T]he Court concludes that this claim fails . . . .”).
106. Id. at *5.
107. See id. (“Since it cannot be said that CGL and CFS-USA had a duty to disclose . . . and
because the SAC does not contain allegations that set forth the requisite degree of scienter for
conscious intent, this [aiding and abetting claim] will be dismissed with prejudice.”).
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C. States That Do Not Recognize the Cause of Action or Remain Unsure
While only some courts in a handful of states, such as Alabama,108
Michigan,109 and Texas,110 have previously declined to recognize aiding
and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty as a cause of action, a few
jurisdictions have recently joined them.111 Specifically, Louisiana law does
not recognize aiding and abetting as a cognizable claim, though its courts
admit other states like New York and Delaware do.112 In Broyles v. Cantor
Fitzgerald & Co.,113 the court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that even
though the plaintiff was able to establish aiding and abetting elements, such
a claim was not actionable in the state of Louisiana.114
Some courts remain confused on the issue of validity regarding the aiding
and abetting theory in their jurisdiction, while others believe such a claim
would not be recognized by their state.115 For example, a North Carolina
108. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. 04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 566900, at *13
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2006) (granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). There,
the court stated it was unable to “find any substantial support . . . that the common law tort of aiding
and abetting a fiduciary breach exists under Alabama law.” Id. at *11.
109. See Kraniak v. Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C., No. 230028, 2002 WL 1308783, at *3
(Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2002) (per curiam) (“No such cause of action in relation to a legal malpractice
claim has been recognized in Michigan and we are not inclined to create such a claim in this
case . . . . [E]ven if there were authority to support such a claim in Michigan, Plaintiff’s claim would
fail.”).
110. Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st. Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“[W]e decline [plaintiff]’s invitation to expand Texas law to allow
a non-client to bring a cause of action for ‘aiding and abetting’ a breach of fiduciary duty, based upon
the rendition of legal advice to an alleged tortfeasor client.”).
111. See DeVries Dairy, L.L.C. v. White Eagle Coop. Ass’n, 974 N.E.2d 1194, 1194 (Ohio 2012)
(choosing not to recognize a civil action for aiding and abetting tortious conduct); see also Sacksteder v.
Senney, No. 24993, 2012 WL 4480695, at *16 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing a malpractice
action against a corporate lawyer for participating in a breach of fiduciary duty); Broyles v. Cantor
Fitzgerald & Co., Nos. 10-864-JJB, 10-857-JJB, 2013 WL 1681150, at *13 (M.D. La. Apr. 17, 2013)
(“However, the Court also recognizes that under Louisiana law, [aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty] is not a cognizable claim.”).
112. See, e.g., Broyles, 2013 WL 1681150, at *13 (acknowledging Louisiana law does not find
aiding and abetting to be a cognizable claim, but finding sufficient facts for a valid claim of aiding and
abetting under New York and Delaware law).
113. Broyles v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., No. 10-864-JJB, 2013 WL 1681150 (M.D. La.
Apr. 17, 2013).
114. Id. at *13.
115. See Veer Right Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Czarnowski Display Serv., No. 14 CVS 1038, 2015 WL
504977, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2015) (admitting uncertainty about whether North Carolina
recognizes aiding and abetting); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. 04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL
566900, at *13 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2006) (“Alabama law does not recognize the common law cause of
action of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty . . . .”).
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court has stated the validity of a claim for aiding and abetting “remains an
open question,”116 while another found that “no such cause of action exists
in North Carolina[,]” and that it remains “undisputed that the Supreme
Court of North Carolina has never recognized such cause of action.”117
Distinctively, another North Carolina court reiterated the lack of clarity on
the issue by stating “[a]s numerous North Carolina decisions have now
recognized . . . it is . . . unclear whether North Carolina recognizes a claim
for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.”118
However, even jurisdictions that declined to accept the aiding and
abetting theory as a cause of action against attorneys have not done so in
absolute terms.119 For instance, Texas common law states that it is “well
settled that an attorney does not owe a professional duty of care to third
parties who are damaged by the attorney’s negligent representation of a
client[;]”120 and, Texas courts remain consistent in their refusal “to expand
Texas law to allow a non-client to bring a cause of action for ‘aiding and
abetting’ a breach of fiduciary duty, based upon the rendition of legal advice
to an alleged tortfeasor client.”121 Simultaneously, it has been clarified
“attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients if they conclusively
establish their alleged conduct was within the scope of their legal
representation of a client,”122 because this “attorney-immunity defense is
intended to ensure ‘loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys
employed as advocates.’”123 As such, an attorney is not shielded from
liability to non-clients for their “actions when they do not qualify as ‘the
kind of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his duties
to his client.’”124 According to Texas courts, the protection from liability
116. Veer Right Mgmt. Grp., 2015 WL 504977, at *3.
117. Bottom v. Bailey, 767 S.E.2d 883, 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
118. Bradshaw v. Maiden, No. 14 CVS 14445, 2015 WL 4720387, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2015).
119. See Cantey Hanger, L.L.P. v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015) (finding it “well settled
that an attorney does not owe a professional care to third parties who are damaged by the attorney’s
negligent representation of a client”).
120. Id.
121. Span Enters. v. Wood, 274 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008,
no pet.) (quoting Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)).
122. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Looper Reed & McGraw, P.C., No. 05-15-00055-CV,
2016 WL 164528, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2016, no pet.).
123. Id.
124. See Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 482, 485 (quoting Dixon Fin. Servs., Ltd. v. Greenberg,
Peden, Siegmyer & Oshman, P.C., No. 01-06-00696, 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (Tex. App.––
Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 20, 2008, pet. denied)) (holding petitioner law firm was entitled to summary
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does not apply because such actions are “entirely foreign to the duties of an
attorney” and “not part of the discharge of an attorney’s duties in
representing a party.”125
III. CONCLUSION
Currently, a majority of states accept the validity of the aiding and abetting
theory against attorneys, stating the specific elements required to establish
its prima facie case, while offering very little guidance on how plaintiffs can
successfully meet the burden by supporting it with sufficient facts. What
makes the matter more complicated is a lack of precedent awarding
plaintiffs’ recovery under an aiding and abetting theory,126 and the failure
to provide guidance regarding which facts are sufficient to result in an
award. At the moment, it appears unlikely that new decisions offering
specificity are on the way, as none of the courts are likely to commit to
creating a new standard that will reshape the confusion in that area; thereby,
providing guidance on the issue. Thus, the actual theory exists and appears
to be an option to pursue, but what would it take for a plaintiff to succeed?
That question remains unanswered, creating a tremendous challenge for
attorneys who need clear guidance on liability and exposure prevention for
their clients, as well as themselves. At this time, it appears the best attorneys
can do to protect themselves from liability in that area is to strictly stay
within the boundaries of “merely providing legal advice” to their client.
Even that concept, however, is not clearly defined, placing various scenarios
in a gray area—that is, defining what “pure legal advice” actually means. In
addition, legal malpractice insurers need to factor aiding and abetting claims
into their calculations of policy costs and, due to the lack of guidance,
insurers are likely to overcharge their customers as a precaution. One

judgment on its immunity defense because it established that its alleged conduct was within the scope
of its legal representation of its client); see also Highland Capital Mgmt., 2016 WL 164528, at *1 (affirming
summary judgment because the defendant attorney acted within the scope of his representation of his
client, and was protected by qualified immunity).
125. Highland Capital Mgmt., 2016 WL 164528, at *4.
126. See, e.g., In re Senior Cottages of Am., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 997, 1007 (8th Cir. 2007)
(demonstrating the difficult burden of proof faced by plaintiffs in aiding and abetting cases, where
there is no standard in place and damages are often speculative).
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previously proposed solution is to resolve the issue by statute,127 but sadly
that solution has not been adopted.
Interestingly, a number of lawyers do not fear this theory for themselves
or their clients because they do not learn about it in law school or in practice
(unless they specialize in legal malpractice), which invites the famous saying:
“ignorance is bliss.”128 However, ignorance is obviously not a solution.
Courts need to take the aiding and abetting theory seriously, i.e., not merely
offer theoretical guidance on what it takes to prove its prima facie case, but
also examine the applicable facts closely and offer true guidance—a long
time needed precedent—that lawyers, judges, and the legal system itself can
properly use in future cases. We must have the opportunity to use stare
decisis in every area of law, including aiding and abetting a client’s breach of
fiduciary duty claims against lawyers!

127. Lewinbuk, supra note 3, at 171–72 (proposing to enact statutes to reduce claims, save time
and expenses, and allow judges the ability to become familiar with the type of claims to help render
decisions).
128. THOMAS GRAY, SELECT POEMS OF THOMAS GRAY 54 (New York, Harper & Bro’s 1895)
(coining the term “ignorance is bliss”); Michael Brandon, The 100 Most Famous Quotable Quotes of all
Time, CURATED QUOTES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.curatedquotes.com/famous-quotes/
[https://perma.cc/N6KJ-QDSL] (including the phrase “ignorance is bliss” in the “hall of fame” of
quotes).

